The Quest for Certainty in the Age of Aesthetics by Niklas, Stefan







Abstract: In this paper, I suggest conceiving the ‘Age of Aesthetics’ and its theo-
retic attempts form Baumgarten to Hegel and from Lessing to Schiller as a quest for
certainty within the utterly uncertain field of the sensuous. Though this quest may
not be an exclusive trait of that age, I claim it is essential for understanding the
driving forces of classical aesthetics. Drawing largely from Ernst Cassirer’s recon-
structions, I also try to link my conception of the Age of Aesthetics to the recently
discussed problem of intuitive understanding as articulated by Eckart Förster. Fi-
nally, I am giving a speculative outlook on the notion of ‘aesthetic certainty’.
The ‘age of aesthetics’ ranges from the publication of Baumgarten’s Aesthetica
in 1750 to Hegel’s death in 1831 and thus covers a period of 81 years. This has
at least been suggested by the organizers of the Conference of the European
Society for Aesthetics in Amsterdam in 2014. In the following, I will take
this suggestion seriously by offering an outlook on the variations of a certain
philosophical theme, which shall make intelligible the assumed ‘spirit’ of that
age.
As the title indicates, I propose to regard the quest for certainty as the
central problem of the age of aesthetics—and more precisely: the quest for
certainty within the world of the sensuous. There are, of course, alternative
ways of making the age of aesthetics conceivable as a whole, but I claim
that the endeavour of a quest for certainty is an essential feature of the age of
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aesthetics. And although this quest is not restricted to aesthetics alone—since
it rather takes place under the general conditions of fundamental change in the
arts, sciences and cultural life in general—it occurs in the field of aesthetics
in a specifically insightful way.
Talking about a ‘quest for certainty’ obviously alludes to John Dewey’s
book with the same title and reflects my general indebtedness to Dewey’s
philosophy.1 My own approach will, however, deflect from the path the great
pragmatist indicated, since my focus is rather on the way in which certainty
is treated in the classical period of philosophical aesthetics and applied to
the problem of intuitive understanding. The textual sources of my argument
are, first, Ernst Cassirer and his reconstruction of ‘classical aesthetics’ and,
second, the contemporary philosopher Eckart Förster and his reconstruction
of a ‘methodology of intuitive understanding’ in Goethe. While Förster de-
lineates the possibility and actuality of intuitive understanding in terms of a
rigorous method of inquiry, I am using Cassirer’s contribution to show that
aesthetics investigates the possibility of intuitive understanding as well. In
the eighteenth century, aesthetics is the branch of philosophy which system-
atically delves into the problems of controlling sensuous intuitions and their
passages—in terms of their lawfulness, for instance—as a source for the cre-
ation of ‘form’.
My attempt to bring these two perspectives together aims at showing
that the struggle with uncertainty in sensuous experience does not prevent
the possibility of intuitive understanding, but rather conditions it—as well
as showing the kind of certainty it conveys. Furthermore, I want to show
that there are two basic ways of intuitive understanding: the methodological
one Förster finds in Goethe and the genuinely aesthetic one represented by
the protagonists of the age of aesthetics. These two ways are consequently
directed at two different modes of certainty: the relative certainty of scientific
inquiry and a more transgressive mode, which I address as aesthetic certainty.
In the following, I begin with a short draft of the age of aesthetics by
setting out the three cornerstones of Baumgarten, Kant and Hegel (I.). After
that, I will try to cut out the ‘classical’ phase of this age from Lessing to
Schiller with the help of Ernst Cassirer (II.). Subsequently, I will combine
the view gained from Cassirer with the problem of intuitive understanding
(III.). Finally, I will sum up my reflections on the quest for certainty in the
age of aesthetics by presenting a speculative outlook on the notion of aesthetic
certainty (IV.).
I. THE THREE MIGHTY CORNERSTONES
If Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten makes the age of aesthetics begin, he does
so by defining its endeavour and its task within the first comprehensive frame-
work, giving aesthetics the shape of a systematically fullfledged discipline.
However, he did not so much systematize the current more or less ‘presystem-
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atic’ aesthetic discourse, but rather developed aesthetics from certain logical
problems he was trying to solve. For Baumgarten—a sharp-witted student
of Christian Wolff—formal analysis was the very business of philosophy and
he was not satisfied with the typical limitations of traditional German school
metaphysics (‘Schulmetaphysik’). So in the end his aesthetics appears as an
epistemological theory of cognition or knowledge (‘Erkenntnis’)—but ‘knowl-
edge’ as provided by sensual activity.2 And thus Baumgarten does not only
start the discipline of aesthetics, but also its quest for certainty, which ap-
pears as the quest for the certainty of knowledge in the insecure field of sensual
experience.
Immanuel Kant, then, develops his momentous contribution to aesthetics
(apart from the transcendental aesthetics of time and space) in his third Cri-
tique, which—as is well known—addresses the problem of judgement. Here,
the question of certainty arises as concerning the reliability and generalization
of sensuous, subjective, experience based judgements. His answer is that the
only kind of judgement which is subjective and still kind of certain—‘certain’
in terms of its legitimate call for general acceptance—is aesthetic judgement
about something as beautiful or sublime. But in contrast to Baumgarten
and in direct rejection of his position, Kant states that aesthetic judgement
does not contain or generate proper knowledge (which, according to Kant, is
only the case in logical judgement). Since it remains a question of taste, aes-
thetic judgement necessarily is subjective, no matter how commonly shared
the respective taste may be. But the play, in which the human capacities
or faculties (‘Vermögen’) of reason find themselves while judging aestheti-
cally, assure us of these very faculties and give the respective judgement a
transsubjective direction.
Before turning to Hegel, I have to admit that Kant did also explicitly
speak of ‘aesthetic certainty’ elsewhere, namely in the course of his published
lectures on logic (the so called Jäsche Logik). Here, he defines certainty as
aesthetic, insofar as it is delivered by sense experience, and is recognized as
something necessary. In other words: if there is something that, according to
sensuous experience can be no different, then this something is aesthetically
certain.3 But this kind of a posteriori certainty is of relatively low status
compared to ‘real’ a priori knowledge, which alone is (or can be) apodictically
certain. But at least Kant acknowledges that aesthetic certainty can support
what in his own words is called ‘the approximation to certainty’ or even the
‘hope . . . for getting to certainty’.4 This hope appears as the driving force of
Kant’s thoughts on logic—and perhaps of his philosophy altogether, including
his aesthetics.
Hegel, finally, turns philosophical aesthetics systematically into a philos-
ophy of art—and art alone. Yet, aesthetics is not only restricted to art as
its subject matter, but the whole function of art is transformed in terms of
a theory of truth—in terms of the self-certainty of the absolute spirit that
is subject and object at the same time. Hegel—who, arguably, is the termi-
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nator of the age of aesthetics—most clearly undertakes a quest for certainty,
as his Phenomenology of Spirit documents. Since Hegel’s dialectical struggle
with sense certainty ‘proves’ that this low kind of certainty is not yet real
and true, he has to keep searching within the developing forms of spirit, and
finds true self-certainty only within the absolute spirit, of which art repre-
sents the sensual level. So art already belongs into the realm of truth as
graduated self-certainty, but art as such is still not entirely sufficient, it is not
yet the highest form of self-certain truth, and not yet the end of the ‘history’
of the spirit. Therefore, Hegel’s quest transfers art to religion and further to
philosophy—and this is precisely what might be regarded not only as the end
of art, but as the end of aesthetics as well.
These three reference points shall give some initial orientation for a per-
spective on the quest for certainty typical of the age of aesthetics. The next
step is to develop this picture a bit further by identifying the classical phase
within that age.
II. ERNST CASSIRER’S RECONSTRUCTION
In order to give a slightly richer picture, I will now turn to Ernst Cassirer’s
reconstruction of ‘classical aesthetics’. Cassirer develops his outlook on the
basic problems of eighteenth century aesthetics in the last chapter of his book
on Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (The Philosophy of Enlightenment), pub-
lished in 1932. Furthermore, he already presents an extensive reconstruction
of what he calls the ‘discovery of the aesthetic world of forms’ in an earlier
book from 1916, called Freiheit und Form (Freedom and Form).5 Since the
latter work is concerned with German intellectual history, there is a strong
emphasis on the German speaking traditions in this part of Cassirer’s recon-
struction of aesthetics.
Combining the two textual sources Cassirer offers I take his conception as
a specification and résumé of the characteristic style of thought of the age of
aesthetics and construe it in terms of the quest for certainty as my thematic
guideline (which is not an explicit issue in Cassirer’s reconstruction itself).
For Cassirer, it is clear that Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (and maybe already
his Metaphysics) means a turning point in aesthetic thought, and therefore
Baumgarten apparently started something. Anyway, Cassirer does not ac-
knowledge Baumgarten as the effective beginner of the philosophical disci-
pline of aesthetics, but rather as someone who first delivers the means for a
still upcoming breakthrough of this branch. This may seem quite surprising
from today’s perspective, but apparently Baumgarten was not as well received
as his legacy makes us think. It is rather Gotthold Ephraim Lessing to whom
Cassirer gives the credits of being the one who ‘broke the spell’.6 But Cassirer
not only suggests an alternative beginning of the age of aesthetics, but also
an alternative ending, thus identifying ‘classical’ aesthetics, which makes for
a slightly different story: With Leibniz in the back, Baumgarten initiates
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what Lessing effectuates—and that is the overcoming of the aesthetics of en-
lightenment by a new synthesis of philosophical rationalism, poetics and art
criticism. So, with Lessing, begins what Cassirer specifically calls ‘classical
aesthetics’. This period appears as a contrasting one between pre-systematic
poetics of enlightenment and post-systematic romanticism and it ends with
Friedrich Schiller, as we will see later. The word ‘systematic’ is used here only
to describe the paradigm of a discipline, not to depreciate the contrasting pe-
riods. Taken strictly as a historical period, Cassirer’s classical aesthetics is
much shorter than the total ‘age of aesthetics’, though fully embraced by it.
In this respect, we are looking at 39 years from Lessing’s Laokoon to Schiller’s
death as the ‘core’ of the age of aesthetics (leaving open whether the counting
makes sense at all).
Age of Aesthetics
c. 81 years (1750 – 1831)
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica – Kant’s Critique of Judgment – Hegel’s death
Lessing’s Laokoon – (Herder and others) – Schiller’s death
Classical Aesthetics
c. 39 years (1766 – 1805)
Figure: alternative periodization schemes for ‘Age of aesthetics’ and
‘Classical aesthetics’
Trying to come to terms with these different schemes of periodization
(see figure above), we may treat Baumgarten and Lessing methodically as a
unit—whereas Baumgarten appears as the first, and Lessing as the second
beginning of aesthetics. This unit is constituted by systematic problems,
which the two thinkers share. Drawing from Cassirer’s reconstruction, these
problems range between two poles, which are sensuous knowledge on the one
hand and the problem of laws in creative (i.e. artistic) production on the
other. Accordingly, the quest for certainty within aesthetics now appears on
the scene as a systematic focus on what I would like to term demonstrative
certainty of an intuition, which is governed by its own rules—where intuition
denotes sensuous and imaginative perception (‘Anschauung’), and rules mean
inner rules of intuition itself, not external regulations.
But what does ‘demonstrative certainty’—a term I take directly from
Cassirer—mean?7 In the context of eighteenth century aesthetics, it confronts
the problem of mere subjectivity, which it tries to ‘solve’ by taking up again
the concept of the ideal subject called ‘the genius’ (especially in Shaftesbury).
Genius, or the idea of it, is the very source of all artistic laws and rules
and thus serves the function of delivering a point of self-certainty. Cassirer
summarizes this idea as follows: ‘Between what the genius does, and what
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the real true rules reveal, no opposition can arise, for in the freedom of the
genius the source of all artistic necessity is enclosed’.8 The necessity of all
artistic activity is what Lessing—according to Cassirer—is after, and this
necessity is what the aesthetician wishes to grasp in a lawlike form. For
such laws—in analogy to the laws of nature, which have to be revealed—are
excellent media of certainty at a moment, when it is already realized that
approaching a state of certainty needs a strict method. Lessing represents
the attempt to synthesize and even harmonize lawfulness and free movement,
which can be paraphrased like this: There should be no determination by
an external law, but there must be an internal law of the nature of artistic
becoming itself, one that can only be revealed by itself (and by no other). In
this line of thought the idea of the self-certain ‘genius’ means the pure act of
production or pure becoming in and of itself. This, in a sense, can be called
an ‘aesthetics of intuition’, as Cassirer does indeed call it, but (unfortunately)
‘intuition’ here denotes the complete or total vision of the genius as embodied
in a great individual artist—with the questionable result that the concept of
intuition, which is applied here, approaches divine intuition.9 In doing so,
the metaphysically overcharged idea of the genius is believed to guarantee a
certain basis for the rules of creative production.
At least two more important agents appear on the scene of Cassirer’s
discussion, namely Herder and Winckelmann. Whereas Herder represents a
radical aesthetics of self-certain intuition, Winckelmann’s truly classicist aes-
thetics of ‘noble simplicity and quiet grandeur’ aims—once more—at the apo-
dictic certainty of a supersensible meaning, which materializes (preferably in
marble) only in order to be capable of being contemplated. In effect, Winck-
elmann attempts to terminate the quest for certainty by giving an ultimate—
and thereby dogmatic—answer to it. Winckelmann conceives aesthetics as
being mostly about works (and not about forces), which are of course made
of some kind of matter, but this matter is transcended by its meaning, which
is a meaning of universal character, escaping the disturbances of the ever-
changing sensuous world.10 Herder in turn fights for a dynamic conception of
‘synthetic comprehension’ (‘synthetisches Begreifen’) and insists on the idea
of individuality: Herder teaches that certainty is something we always already
have—and thus the task is not so much to search for certainty in an analytic
fashion, but to reveal it by acting creatively.11 This idea relies on the self-
revealing self-certainty of the creative human mind’s forces or capabilities.
As Cassirer stresses, Herder presents a version of the notion of certainty and
of its sources, which is essentially based on individuality. This conception
draws on the rather poetic work of his teacher Johann Georg Hamann, who
is regarded by Cassirer as the important link for the passage from Lessing to
Herder.12 But in contrast to his teacher—who was even more radically foster-
ing individuality and whose style of thought was everything but systematic
(‘what he gives are not fragments, but fragments of fragments’13)—Herder
tries to establish a more stringent philosophy of history in general and of aes-
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thetics in particular, especially in his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte
der Menschheit (1784-1791) and his Kritische Wälder (1769). The idea of
the intrinsic rules of action and (artistic) creation is formulated as ‘succession
through force’, which means a succession, that is guided by the poetic ‘force’
of a certain individual.14 For Cassirer the important discovery that Herder’s
philosophy brings to the fore is the idea of the basic act of forming (‘Formung’
= giving shape to something), which means the essential medium of human
self-knowledge and self-determination.15
Cassirer deliberately stages the relation between Winckelmann’s so called
‘classicism’ and Herder’s more progressive position in inverted order, as if
Winckelmann’s writings were the opposing reaction to Herder’s. Actually
it was Herder, who polemically reacted to Winckelmann’s influential ap-
proach, while referring more balancedly—although still critically—to Less-
ing’s Laokoon (which was itself already a reaction to Winckelmann). Winck-
elmann’s aesthetics first appeared in his Gedanken über die Nachahmung der
griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst in 1756 and thus very
much at the beginning of the age of aesthetics, whereas Herder’s Kritische
Wälder appeared 13 years later in 1769. Winckelmann’s approach would even
fall out of classical aesthetics altogether, if Cassirer would strictly limit this
period to the linear time scale illustrated above. But Cassirer’s non-linear
presentation is not a clumsy attempt to get Winckelmann into the story; on
the contrary, it is strictly justified by Cassirer’s method, which seeks to recon-
struct the problems of aesthetics by putting them into a systematic context.
Winckelmann is the antagonist, whose appearance represents the one great
alternative to what the protagonists of the aesthetic discovery pursue. If
there is a dynamic notion of form in Lessing and Herder, there must also be a
static or ‘plastic’ one as its counterpart—and this is precisely Winckelmann’s
notion of form.16 Furthermore, Winckelmann’s influence was obviously not
restricted to the time of his writings, but pervaded the aesthetic discourse for
a long time as a recurring authority. In this respect, Cassirer tries to do jus-
tice to Winckelmann’s approach as an important stage in aesthetic thought
which in retrospect ‘leads’ to Schiller and Goethe as the ‘sublation’ of classical
aesthetics.
Consequently, Friedrich Schiller makes his appearance in the course of
Cassirer’s Freiheit und Form not merely as the representative of yet another
stage within classical aesthetics, but rather as the culmination and ending
of this specific era. However, at first sight, Schiller seems to discard the
quest for certainty altogether, since his conception of the aesthetic play—as
developed in the Aesthetic Letters—promotes indeed an appraisal of suspense
and a certain kind of uncertainty. Indetermination, which means liberation,
appears as the purpose and the very nature of aesthetic experience, which
thus becomes the means of the core topic of Schiller’s philosophy: freedom.
Freedom is only to be found in the aesthetic play, where it is experienced
in the phenomenon of beauty. Beauty means the aesthetically experienced
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certainty of freedom as occurring in the state of playing—though getting
into the state of playing is itself a rather uncertain affair. The dialectical
character of the play—being an uncertain affair, which nevertheless assures
of the possibility of freedom—corresponds to the intricate conditions of the
realization of freedom in human life. This is reflected by the pedagogical trait
of Schiller’s aesthetics, which is about showing how the experienced certainty
of freedom may emerge in an aesthetically edified human life—a life, in which
the ‘ludic drive’ is fostered in its quest for beauty.
Cassirer’s reconstruction of Schiller’s aesthetics is admittedly much more
detailed and complex than my rather pointed interpretation, which puts em-
phasis on the significance of freedom and beauty as modalities of the quest
for certainty. But Cassirer, too, stresses that in Schiller beauty is constituted
by the emergence of freedom in a concrete sensuous appearance—and this,
again, means that freedom becomes certain in, and only in, beauty as pro-
vided by concrete vision.17 In other words, an encounter with the phenomenon
of concrete beauty, in the dynamic state of aesthetic playing, gives evidence of
freedom’s possibility in human life, an evidence which is not inferred, but sen-
suous and intuitive. But the intuitiveness of individual encounters with the
phenomenon of beauty does not render these encounters simply contingent
and merely subjective. Cassirer refers to a couple of letters, which Schiller
wrote to Körner in the 1790s (a series of these became the famous Kallias-
letters), where he shapes his ‘objective’ (‘gegenständliche’) law of beauty,
which is rooted in a general cognitive function and a general drive within
human nature.18
I would like to sum up Schiller’s position by saying that striving for beauty
means striving for freedom and both are modes of the striving (or, along the
lines of Kant’s logic, modes of the hope) for human self-certainty. As Schiller
states in another letter to Körner from 1794 (which is again quoted by Cas-
sirer), beauty is not an empirical term of description, but a normative claim
and as such an imperative: We are still searching for freedom as presented
in appearance.19 And aesthetics, in this sense, is the normative theory of
reassuring humanity of itself.
If Baumgarten and Lessing represent alternative versions of the beginning,
Schiller and Hegel represent alternative versions of the ending of the paradig-
matic period of aesthetic thought in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century: Whereas Schiller represents the end of classical aesthetics (according
to Cassirer), Hegel represents the end of the whole age of aesthetics. But no
matter which ending might be regarded as the more significant one, either
way it becomes clear that the aesthetic pursuit of certainty requires an im-
portant role for intuition, not only in terms of concrete vision, but also in
terms of the power of judgement as well as in terms of a distinctive mode
of aesthetic reason. As we can see in aesthetic thinkers from Baumgarten
and Lessing to Schiller and Hegel, aesthetics as philosophy treats certainty
by recognizing the specific ways, in which poetically mediated intuition is en-
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gaged in aesthetic operations and in aesthetic experience in general. This
implies that the intuition in question is by no means ‘immediate’, but rather
thoroughly mediated by creative imagination. The term ‘mediated intuition’
is the keyword which leads to the third part of this paper, where, finally,
Goethe enters the scene as the hero of Eckart Förster’s recent reconstruction
of German Idealism, to which I turn now.
III. THE METHODOLOGY AND AESTHETICS OF
INTUITION
In his brilliant book about the Twenty-five years of Philosophy—which ad-
dresses the period between the release of the Critique of Pure Reason and the
Phenomenology of Spirit—Eckart Förster recently exhibited Goethe’s studies
in the natural sciences as the execution of a ‘methodology of intuitive under-
standing’. Förster addresses a crucial period of philosophical thought, which
falls entirely into the age of aesthetics, as described above. However, Förster
is not addressing—at least not explicitly—problems of aesthetics. This is
understandable, in as far as his major task consists in reconstructing the out-
rageous idea that philosophy might have begun with Kant and ended with
Hegel (according to those philosophers themselves). This idea and the task
to make it somehow intelligible does not primarily concern aesthetic thought,
which is moreover clearly not the only signature of philosophy in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In this sense, Förster’s not consid-
ering the aesthetic dimension of his subject matter is excusable, and it avoids
a misunderstanding about the status of intuitive understanding as Förster
conceives it in the context of scientific inquiry. Still, I would like to draw
a connection between Förster’s reconstruction of Goethe’s ‘methodology of
intuitive understanding’ and the function of ‘intuition’ in classical aesthetics.
What does intuitive understanding mean? The term appears in the third
Critique in §§ 76 and 77, where Kant uses ‘intuitive understanding’ on the one
side and ‘intellectual perception’ on the other as limit-concepts in order to
show what human understanding is like: it is discursive in understanding and
sensuous in perception. Thus intuitive understanding, as well as intellectual
perception, is something humans do not have—in other words, what these
concepts delineate is not human nature, but divine nature. Förster, however,
argues that there are delicate distinctions within Kant’s argumentation, which
(deliberately or not) allow for different readings concerning the range of this
concept or idea.20 Thus, Förster shows that the speculation about intuitive
understanding does not necessarily lead to the assumption of a divine vision of
nature in its totality; it is also possible to assume such a vision only of aspects
of nature, i.e. of some of its products. And that assumption makes plausible a
considerably more modest version of intuitive understanding, which suits the
human mind as it only aims at synthetically universal understanding. This is
a mode of understanding that starts with conceiving the whole of a particular
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something and then moves on to the different internal states of that whole,
i.e. the observable moments or phases, in which the whole becomes in a sense
‘viewable’. If discursive understanding proceeds by going from one part to
another (discurrere in the Latin sense), in order to get sight of the whole by
summarizing the parts, intuitive understanding has by contrast already an
idea of the whole as it begins to proceed. This initial idea may be dark and
incomplete, but it controls the process of understanding, which concerns the
clarification of its very own parts, which is to say: its internal passages.
Interpreting the inherent distinctions of Kant’s claim, Förster shows (es-
pecially in the eleventh chapter of his book) that Goethe—who was in this
respect strongly inspired by Spinoza, or rather by the Jacobian Spinozism
of his time—has in fact established a plausible scientific method of intu-
itive understanding in the guise of his morphology of plants and later in his
chromatics.21 This method takes its starting point at the conceived whole of
the life-cycle of a plant (or the whole of the colour circle), and directs the
scientific mind to the moments of passage within the cycle. In this sense, the
methodology of intuitive understanding means the study of passages within
the dynamics of a transformative whole (of a plant, for instance). The idea of
the whole—the intuition—does not yet understand itself and therefore aims
at a complete series of its internal passages.
But what is a passage? It is the conceivable, though not as such per-
ceivable, way from one integral part of the respective whole to another part,
which—according to the series that constitutes the processual whole—is the
next part. Strictly speaking, the objects of direct perception are the concrete
parts, while the passages between them are imagined—whereas ‘imagined’
does not mean deliberately made up, but cognitively apprehended (based on
the concrete experience of systematic relations between the parts). Thus the
indirect perception of such passages can only take place across the dynamics
of sensual changes. Understanding passages means understanding the struc-
ture of a transitional movement from one state into another. If this kind of
understanding has a direction as regards its perspective, it is twofold and re-
ciprocal: It goes top-down from the intuited idea of the whole to its internal
passages and then bottom-up from the concrete transitory phenomena to the
whole, of which these phenomena are the momentary phases.
In his interpretation of the famous §§ 76 and 77 of the Critique of the
Power of Judgment, Förster puts a lot of effort into explaining that ‘intuitive
understanding’ and ‘intellectual intuition’ are by no means two names for
the same thing, but rather opposing limit-concepts. According to Förster’s
reading, they are two different attempts of speculation on the fundamental
character of intuition and non-human (or super-human) understanding. But
while intuitive understanding can be defended both as a possibility of human
understanding in general and as an actual methodology of human inquiry (as
in Goethe), there is no such path for intellectual intuition (even though Fichte
tried to find it).22 The main reason is that intellectual intuition would require
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a mode of actually creating the objects of understanding, since they cannot
possibly stem from empirical, i.e. sensual intuition. This might in a sense
seem possible in mathematics, but not in any kind of actual inquiry of the
graspable phenomena of nature, understood as the world human beings live
in. In other words, Kant’s insistence on the fundamentally sensual character
of human intuition is right: There can be no purely intellectual and thus non-
sensual human intuition. However, from the obvious limitations of sensual
intuition as the very source of uncertainty it does not follow that all modes
of human understanding necessarily need to bypass these limitations strictly
discursively. While human understanding is limited anyway, the study of
phenomenal concretion as attained through attentive sensual detection is as
much a source of knowledge—namely demonstrative knowledge—as discursive
knowledge and thus another path of understanding. To avoid confusion: The
claim is not that there is a pure mode of intuitive understanding, nor that the
discursive and the intuitive modes are ever separated from each other. Hu-
man understanding is one, but it has (at least) two modes. Furthermore, the
intuitive mode of understanding does not exclude discursive cognition from
its operations—and as far as I can see neither Goethe, nor Förster is claiming
anything like this. It rather integrates or accompanies discursivity without
being reducible to it. So the claim is that intuitive understanding is possible
and actually happening as soon as an inquiring mind gives attention to con-
crete occurrences as passing moments or stages of a whole—a whole, which is
synthetically apprehended and always a relative, though still objective, one.
Coming back to aesthetics, the most remarkable point is that the sys-
tematic focus on phenomenal concretion and the moments of sensuous and
sensual passages delineate precisely one of the central topics of philosophi-
cal aesthetics since Baumgarten. This is especially true for Lessing, Herder
and Schiller, whose aesthetics of intuition Ernst Cassirer subsumes under the
principle idea of ‘form’ or ‘forming’. And furthermore this is already true
for the—pre-systematic—aesthetic thought of Shaftesbury, who, as Cassirer
presumes,23 introduced the term ‘intuitive understanding’—though in a Neo-
platonic, not in a Spinozistic sense—into aesthetic discourse in the beginning
of the eighteenth century. In this sense, Goethe’s method in the natural
sciences and the parallel endeavour of aesthetics share a common ground in
intuitive understanding! But it is important to note that they do not merge
into each other. Both are rigorous in style and scope, and they operate inde-
pendently. But what they share is a problem, which concerns the promotion
of sense-certainty to knowledge-certainty—to use more or less Hegelian terms.
They do, of course, differ with regard to their subject matter: the subject of
aesthetics is primarily poetic imagination and art, as well as the self-reflection
of humanity in terms of its creative forces, whereas the subject of Goethe’s
scientific methodology consists in the conceivable phenomena of nature. Thus
we have two basic modes of intuitive understanding:
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a) intuitive understanding, scientifically considered for the study of nature;
b) intuitive understanding, aesthetically considered for the study of the hu-
man capacity of poetic imagination and artistic creation.
Consequently, intuitive understanding—be it from the perspective of artis-
tic or of scientific intuition—shows two poles of certainty, which build a cor-
responding cycle: First, the initially had, but still unclear certainty of the
initial whole, and second, the articulated, effectively transformed certainty
of the ‘new’ whole. The latter is the product of the largely non-discursive—
or: not-only-discursive—explication, which the passage-oriented study under-
takes, in order to make the intuition understood. But none of these modes
of certainty are immediate or self-evident, even though common sense and
a longstanding tradition of ‘immediatism’ in philosophy may notoriously say
so. They are always already entangled in articulation and thus modes of
mediated intuitive certainty. The initially had intuition is already mediated,
since every act of perception (which is not the mere reception of sense-data)
has its inner articulation or ‘symbolic pregnancy’ as Cassirer says. And the
mediation of certainty as resulting from intuitive understanding consists in
the method by which it is attained—like the method of ordering the series of
cyclically passing stages as in morphology or chromatics.
While Goethe’s morphology and chromatics, as Förster maintains, can be
regarded as an attempt to smooth the way for a methodological considera-
tion of intuitive understanding in the natural sciences, aesthetics—as a new
branch of philosophy—is already in its own way exploring this path of intu-
ition as a modality of understanding and (normative) reason.24 Summing up
what has been said above, aesthetics in the eighteenth century—at least since
Shaftesbury, as Cassirer pointed out—becomes the specific kind of philosophy,
which reveals the functioning of intuition as thought-controlled affection.25 It
is thus another crucial source for a philosophic theory of intuitive understand-
ing, which Förster is looking out for.
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that even Förster—who, as I
said, widely neglects aesthetics—chooses the decisively aesthetic example of
watching an ‘experimental’ movie, as he tries to demonstrate how intuitive
understanding works (apart from Goethe’s manners of studying nature).26
Förster thinks of a movie, which is ‘experimental’ in the sense that the scenes,
which make up the filmic story, appear in a seemingly disjointed order. Only
after watching the whole movie, when the final scene has shed a new light
on all the preceding scenes, the connectedness of the parts is finally revealed
and a key for understanding the whole story is delivered. I guess we should
best think of movies like Memento by Christopher Nolan, the episodic movies
by Alejandro González Iñárritu like 21 grams, or, probably best known, Pulp
Fiction (by Quentin Tarantino). While watching either one of these movies
for the first time, the parts of the whole are given to the viewer, but what is
lacking are the passages that connect them and make them a whole. Yet, as
soon as the viewer has the key to the idea of the whole, as delivered by the
253
The Quest for Certainty in the Age of Aesthetics
last scene, as Förster imagines, she or he can watch the movie for the second
time and easily see the intelligible passages of the parts in the light of their
final connection.
Unfortunately, Förster did not elaborate this example any further, and,
surprisingly, he does not even mention the aesthetic quality of the filmic expe-
rience, while stressing its quotidian character. Still, this example emphasizes
an inherent connection between the scientific methodology of intuitive un-
derstanding on the one side and aesthetics as the philosophy of poetically
mediated intuition on the other. The link between them is the principle of
exemplaricity: On the scientific as well as on the aesthetic side, the example—
i.e. the description of a singular concrete appearance—serves as the means
of demonstration, which is the very mode of generating intuitive certainty.
Förster ends his book on The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy with an
outlook on the future of philosophy and states that the only path that is still
open for the philosophical efforts of tomorrow, was the path of intuition or,
more precisely, of a ‘scientia intuitiva’.27 Since the path of discursive under-
standing is already well-trodden, the philosophy of the future will have to be
a (new) philosophy of intuition. If Förster’s statement is adequate, it would
implicitly underline the significance and importance of philosophical aesthet-
ics out of the spirit of its classical period, when the concept of intuition was
shaped and valued by this new branch of philosophy.
Philosophy would, however, first have to come to terms with the unwanted
(metaphysically overcharged) implications of this concept in order to make
the idea of intuition more clear. In other words, philosophy would have to
articulate its intuitions about ‘intuition’. Therefore—at least in the recon-
structive attitude Förster promotes—it would have to recollect all the effort
and the hopes that have already been put into ‘intuition’ in various philo-
sophical traditions. To name but a few outlooks from the twentieth century,
that should be considered as treating intuitions as the source, the means or
the goal of philosophical inquiry, there are the tradition of phenomenology
since Husserl, the Bergsonian tradition of intuitionism through Deleuze, the
use of epistemic and ethical intuitions in parts of the analytic tradition, as
well as James’ radical empiricism and other aspects of American pragmatism
like Dewey’s emphasis on ‘qualitative thought’. Besides this, there are already
attempts to explain how a methodological consideration of ‘the genius’ might
be sustained—taken as a figurative, but still necessary assumption about the
(non-mythical) source of creativity—, without any concession whatsoever to
the metaphysics of romanticism.28
Förster’s claim concerning the future of philosophy, which aims at (yet
another) complete revision of philosophy’s prevalent tasks, is too bold, too
far-reaching, and still too vague to be discussed and developed at the end of
this paper. But if the envisaged path of a ‘scientia intuitiva’ will be taken
all (no matter on which side of the path), there is a lot of material to be
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systematically reconstructed—and it will be inescapable to incorporate aes-
thetics, which is no less than the most competent authority for the forces and
‘laws’ that make up and control the process of intuition as passage-oriented
attention. It is thus a distinguished guide to find the path, which may lead
to a science of intuition in the first place.
IV. A SPECULATIVE OUTLOOK ON ‘AESTHETIC
CERTAINTY’
Being inspired by such visionary suggestions, I shall sum up my findings
by speculating on an answer to the remaining question: What is aesthetic
certainty? If the rise of (classical) aesthetics is about a quest for a specific
kind of certainty (emerging within the intuitive mode of understanding), this
kind of certainty must consequently be qualified as aesthetic. To be clear, not
all intuitive understanding proceeds aesthetically, but all aesthetic certainty
can only be attained within intuitive understanding.
The following is a collection of speculative elements towards an intelligible
notion of aesthetic certainty:
1. Aesthetic certainty is certainty as concretely experienced in intuitive un-
derstanding.
1.1. It is derived from demonstrative insight.
1.1.1. ‘Insight’ means the moment of recognizing or grasping something
sensually present in its complex quality and relations.
1.1.2. ‘Demonstrative’ indicates that this kind of insight relies on some-
thing that is shown. In other words, it relies on a material (sensual)
vision, in which understanding is itself carried out. This happens, for
instance, in composing a series of specimen, which demonstrates the
overarching idea of the morphology of a species; and this happens in ex-
periencing a work of art, say a movie, a poem or a piece of music, which
cannot be understood properly by description, but only by showing its
impact in the quality of its appearing.29 In both cases the understanding
of passages is essential, and these passages need to be presented in order
to be graspable.
1.1.3. Demonstrative insight equals the function of ‘knowledge’ (though
this term is probably too captious) as regards the material conception of
the complex relations of something present to sensual intuition.
1.2. This insight, from which aesthetic certainty is derived, is insight into
concretion.
1.2.1. Insight into concretion basically means that it does not work by
means of abstraction, which is the very instrument of discursive under-
standing. It is a material, not a formal insight into sensually apprehended
dynamic structures (passages).
1.2.2. Abstract ideas (like the idea of the whole of a plant’s life cycle, or
the whole of the movie’s story) may inform, even pervade the process
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of intuitive understanding as long as they are converted into concrete
material moments of contemplation (as passing complexes, which present
themselves to sensual attention).
2. Certainty becomes specifically aesthetic as it is derived from the conscious
intensification of sensual and imaginative activity.
2.1. This intensification conveys a greater clarity of sensual conception.30
2.1.1. As defined ex negativo ‘intensification’ means to forgo the econom-
ical reduction of ‘symbolic’ abbreviations, which on their part serve the
kind of clarity ‘logical’ conception provides.
2.1.2. Consequently ‘intensification’ means the conscious broadening of
one’s attention to the phenomenal patterns of actual experience.
2.2. The clarity in question (which is precisely not the clarity of ‘logical’
conception) means the imaginative or poetical enhancement of sensual
conception (which is not to be confused with mere fancy).
2.3. Clarity is the prerequisite of certainty: Clarity as poetical enhance-
ment of a consciously broadened sensual conception is the prerequisite of
aesthetic certainty.
2.4. Aesthetic certainty thus consists (at least in part) in the experience of
such clarity in sensual conception.
2.4.1. An alternative phrasing, using Herder’s terms, is: Aesthetic cer-
tainty consists in a self-consciously experienced act of synthetic compre-
hension.
2.4.2. The ‘experience’ of clarity indicates the moment, in which synthetic
comprehension (as an act of understanding) becomes apparent as a sin-
gular event.
3. Aesthetic certainty is the self-reflective experience of certainty.
3.1. This thesis was already implied in the preceding ones, especially in
2.2. and 2.4., since the experience of clarity in conception (insight into
concretion) is necessarily self-reflective.
3.2. Certainty can only be experienced, where uncertainty is the normal
case: namely in the field of sensual experience, which is the sphere of hu-
man’s limited intuition. Otherwise neither a methodology, nor an aesthet-
ics of intuition would be needed. This we learn from the age of aesthetics
(as described above).
3.2.1. Among other things we learn (from Kant) that the subjectivity of
judgement becomes certain in aesthetic judgement, which takes place
despite the fundamental uncertainties of its common acceptance as ob-
jective.
3.2.2. We also learn (from Herder) about individuality as certain in the
aesthetic act of forming, which is, in short, the act of controlling inner
and outer forces.
4. Aesthetic certainty is the certainty of freedom.
4.1. Together with ‘form’, this is the actual motif of classical aesthetics and
the pressing problem to which it is responding in the beginning (Lessing)
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and in the end (Schiller).
4.2. Lessing’s claim (i.e. Cassirer’s reading of it) about the self-governed
rules of aesthetic intuition delineates the ‘individual law’, which is the
epitome of human freedom.31
4.2.1. While creating a work of art (or performing an aesthetic vision in
general), I experience myself as the ruler, who is actively setting the ‘law’
of this act.
4.2.2. In setting the law in an aesthetic act, I experience myself as acting
freely.
4.2.3. In experiencing myself as the ruler, who sets the law freely, not only
the law, but my freedom to set it, become certain—though this certainty
prevails only in the aesthetic act.
4.3. From Schiller we learn that freedom is experienced in the dynamic state
of playing, which is the moment, in which human life reflects itself.
4.3.1. The playing is between me and a concrete sensual appearance.
4.3.2. The dynamic state of playing is the moment, in which beauty is
experienced—as a concrete sensual appearance and my reflective expe-
rience of this experience.
4.3.3. Beauty is the experience of a concrete sensual appearance of freedom
itself.
4.3.4. Thus the possibility of freedom becomes a certainty of aesthetic
experience (and the quest for the realization of this possibility takes
place by means of aesthetic edification).
4.4. Thus, the certainty of freedom is conveyed aesthetically—and what
becomes certain in aesthetic experience is freedom (or the possibility of
it).
5. Aesthetic certainty is the self-certainty that I am existing in this world—
and that I fit into it.32
5.1. It is for certain the clarity of my sensual conception, my demonstrative
insight into concretion, the intensification of my sensual and imaginative
activities, it is my judgement, my individuality in the act of forming, my
rule for my creative act, and it is my freedom I experience.
5.2. By experiencing the world with the greatest clarity of insight into
its sensually comprehended concretion, and while experiencing my own
‘forces’ and the inner-worldly possibility of freedom, I experience myself
as having an affirmative attitude towards the world. So one thing is cer-
tain: I am part of this world, I must be existing in it and I must somehow
be fitting into it.
6. Aesthetic certainty is never able to promote itself to the state of ‘truth’:
The quest goes on forever.
mail@stefanniklas.de
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NOTES
1. Cf. Dewey 2008.
2. See the famous § 1 of Baumgarten
2009, which gives the definition of aes-
thetics as the science of sensual knowl-
edge/cognition: ‘Aesthetica (. . . ) est sci-
entia cognitionis sensitivae’.
3. ‘Certainty’ is Kant’s name for the modal-
ity of logical completeness of knowledge
(‘logische Vollkommenheit des Erkenntnis-
ses der Modalität nach’) and aesthetic
certainty is its sensory correlate. Cf.
Immanuel Kant 1923, volume IX, chap-
ter IX (http://www.korpora.org/kant/
aa09/).
4. Cf. Kant 1923, IX, p. 84 (http://www.
korpora.org/kant/aa09/084.html).
5. Ernst Cassirer 1998 (hereafter referred to
as Cassirer PdA); Cassirer 1994 (hereafter
referred to as Cassirer FF).
6. ‘In der Tat blieb die Wirkung Baumgar-
tens auf einen engen Kreis beschränkt, und
in das eigentliche Leben der neuen deut-
schen Dichtung hat er kaum eingegriffen.
Erst Lessing hat hier den Bann gebrochen.’
Cassirer PdA: p. 477 (emphasis by Cas-
sirer).
7. In German it is ‘demonstrative Gewißheit’.
Cassirer uses the term as a take-off to
his description of Baumgarten’s philoso-
phy, cf. PdA: p. 453.
8. My translation from Cassirer FF: p. 105:
‘Zwischen dem, was das Genie tut, und
dem, was die echten wahrhaften Regeln
aussagen, kann kein Gegensatz entstehen:
denn in der Freiheit des Genies ist der
Quell aller künstlerischen Notwendigkeit
erschlossen.’
9. Cassirer FF: p. 106: ‘Beide, das göttliche
und das menschliche ‘Genie’, verbindet der
gemeinsame Zug, daß sie eine Anschauung
des Ganzen der Welt ihr eigen nennen, die
nicht mühsam aus den Teilen zusammen-
gelesen werden muß. Kraft dieser Gesamt-
ansicht wird jede echte Tragödie zur wahr-
haften Theodizee.’
10. Cf. Cassirer FF: pp. 127-139, and within
this chapter, especially pp. 130-132.
11. Cf. Cassirer FF: pp. 108-127, and for
Herder’s conception of ‘synthetic compre-
hension’ see especially p. 119.
12. Cf. Cassirer FF: p. 108.
13. Cassirer FF: p. 109, my translation.
14. The respective passage is to be found in
chapter 16 of the first volume of the Kri-
tische Wälder (Herder 1769) and quoted
in Cassirer FF: p. 121.
15. Cassirer: FF: p. 127.
16. Cf. Cassirer FF: p. 139.
17. Cf. Cassirer FF: p. 285. ‘Vision’ as
well as the German word ‘(sinnliche) An-
schauung’ are of course not restricted to
visual perception, but indicate sensual ex-
perience in all its modalities.
18. Cf. Cassirer FF: p. 284.
19. Cassirer FF: p. 288.
20. Eckart Förster 2012, 158-160, and 253-276.
21. Cf. Förster 25 Jahre: chapter 4 (‘Wie
wird man Spinozist’; ‘How to become a
Spinozist’), pp. 87-109.
22. Cf. chapters 8 and 10 of Förster’s book.
23. Cf. Cassirer PdA: p. 424. As the foot-
note on this page indicates, Cassirer seems
to read Shaftesbury mainly through or at
least in connection with Schiller. This
becomes more obvious in his essay on
‘Schiller and Shaftesbury’ from 1935, in:
Cassirer 2004, 333-352.
24. This view — at least as regards the re-
lation of art and natural sciences (both
embodied in Goethe) — is supported by
David E. Wellbery in an essay on Förster’s
idea of a ‘methodology of intuitive under-
standing’, cf. Wellbery 2013, 259-274.
25. Cf. Cassirer: PdA, pp. 417-443 (‘IV. Die
Ästhetik der Intuition und das Genieprob-
lem’), especially p. 425.
26. Förster 2012, 261.
27. Cf. Förster 2012, 366, cf. also Förster
2012, 371.
28. Besides Cassirer it was, for instance, Edgar
Wind, who took up this task and showed
(already in his remarkable dissertation
from 1922), this reading of the idea of the
genius tracks back to Kant’s methodologi-
cal use of it. Cf. Wind 2011, 295-300.
29. The term ‘appearing’ as opposed to ‘ap-
pearance’ is borrowed from Martin Seel.
30. The terminology here is more or less taken
from Cassirer PdA: p. 466.
31. I borrow this term, of course, from Sim-
mel.
32. I emphasized the significance of aesthetic
experience for taking part in the world and
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fitting into it in my book Die Kopfhöre-
rin, Niklas 2014. At least in part, the ar-
gument draws from Josef Früchtl’s thesis
about the reestablishment of trust into the
world by aesthetic experience of movies, cf.
Früchtl 2013.
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